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Divinity, Noēsis, and Aristotelian Friendship  
 
John A. Houston 
 
Aristotle’s NE X claim that the best human life is one devoted to contemplation (theoria) seems in 
tension with his emphasis elsewhere on our essentially political nature, and more specifically, his 
claim that friendship is necessary for our flourishing. For, if our good can be in principle realized 
apart from the human community, there seems little reason to suggest we ‘need’ friends, as he 
clearly does in NE VIII & IX. I argue that central to Aristotle’s NE X discussion of contemplation 
is the claim that our chief good accords with whatever is ‘most divine’ in us, viz. our rational nature 
(NE 1177b12-18). Thus, the best human life involves the excellent exercise of our rational 
capacities. I distinguish two ways in which human beings flourish through exercising their 
rationality. The first is in the activity of theoria. The second, I argue, can be found in the virtuous 
activity of complete friendship (teleia philia). For Aristotle the truest form of friendship is an 
expression of rationality. It is characterized not merely by our living together, but conversing, and 
sharing one another’s thoughts (NE 1170b12-14). Examining Aristotle’s notion of a friend as 
‘another self’ (allos autos), I argue that through friendship human beings come to better know 
themselves and the world in which they live. Complete friendship involves a (uniquely human) 
second-order awareness of oneself in another, and through this awareness our understanding of 
ourselves and the world in which we live is enriched, confirmed, and enjoyed through the presence 
of other minds. Thus, the highest form of Aristotelian friendship is an intellectual activity through 
which we attain an analogue of the divine contemplation of the unmoved mover, thereby living with 
respect to what is most divine in us, but doing so in accordance with our uniquely rational-political 
nature. 
 
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ᾿ ανθρώποις, εφ᾿ ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης 
ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει.1  
For the life of the gods is blessedly happy throughout, while that of human beings is so to the extent 
that there belongs to it some kind of semblance of this sort of activity. (NE 1178b25-27)2 
 
 
A Tension in Aristotle’s Ethical Thought 
 
Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) poses an interpretive problem for scholars 
of Aristotle’s ethical thought. Prior to Book X in the NE Aristotle presents the chief good 
 
1 Aristotle (1962).  
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics are taken from 
Rowe, Oxford: 2002. All others are taken from The Complete Works of Aristotle, Princeton: 1984. 





of human beings as the good of a political animal, and one that is realized in the context of 
other political animals. He expends considerable effort in Books I-IX discussing moral and 
social virtues, relating them to interpersonal relationships and living well in the polis.3 
Further, he devotes a very long discussion in NE VIII & IX to the importance of friendship 
(philia) to eudaimonia. Indeed, no single topic receives more extensive treatment in the NE 
than friendship. Nevertheless, shortly after concluding his treatment of friendship he argues 
that eudaimonia consists in a life devoted to contemplation (theōria). But such a life seems 
compatible with living in contemplative solitude apart from the human community. This 
presents a puzzle: Are we political beings whose flourishing is realized in relationship with 
other human beings, or are we such that we can be eudaimonic living alone in 
contemplation? And if we can flourish living alone, what need do we have for friendship? 
In what follows I will look briefly and critically at three different ways scholars 
have responded to the ostensibly competing conceptions of eudaimonia in the NE. I will 
then revisit the question of human flourishing in light of Aristotle’s discussion of 
friendship, arguing that, although there remains an element of tension between the life 
devoted to practical activity and the life devoted to contemplation, this tension does not 
imply that human beings either can realize their good in isolation. Further, by drawing on 
several texts within the Aristotelian corpus I will offer reasons for understanding Aristotle’s 
Book X account of theōria as compatible with his emphasis in Books VIII & IX on the 
importance of friendship to human flourishing.  
 
Three Responses to the Tension  
 
There are three ways that scholars have responded to the problem of competing 
conceptions of eudaimonia in the NE. The first response suggests that there is an unnoticed 
and unresolved tension in the ethical thought of Aristotle; one which he fails to provide the 
resources to resolve. The second claims that in Book X Aristotle radically re-conceives the 
 
3 In NE IV for example, he analyzes the virtues of open-handedness (eleutheriotēs); munificence 
(megaloprepeia); greatness of soul (megalopsuchia); and mildness (praotēs). Further, the entirety of 
Book V is devoted to a discussion of justice. Finally, Books VIII and IX are devoted to the subject 
of friendship (philia). None of these virtues are possible outside of the human community.  





human good, adopting the conception of our flourishing in a life of isolated contemplation.  
The third attempts to reconcile the two ‘competing’ accounts of the human good.  
I. Thomas Nagel serves as an example of the first response. Nagel argues that 
Aristotle’s ethical thought “exhibits indecision between two accounts of eudaimonia— a 
comprehensive and an intellectualist account”.4 The intellectualist account identifies 
eudaimonia solely with activity of the theoretical intellect, whereas the comprehensive 
account involves not only the exercise of the intellectual virtues, but also the full range of 
human life and activities (including the moral virtues, and the importance of interpersonal 
relationships within the context of the human community). As Nagel puts it, according to 
the comprehensive account of eudaimonia, Aristotle recognizes the composite nature of the 
human being “as involving reason, emotion, perception, and action in an ensouled body,” 
whereas according to the intellectualist account he does not.5 Nagel suggests that 
Aristotle’s “indecision” between these two accounts persists and is never resolved. He 
correctly points out that Aristotle insists that our flourishing requires living a life of activity 
in accordance with what is highest in us (nous), but exactly how this is accomplished or 
what it finally looks like in our daily activities remains a puzzle. More specifically, how 
human relationships might finally figure into Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia is a 
mystery for Nagel. He suggests that if one were to persist in asking how the activities of the 
political community are to fit into the final and complete account of human life that the 
answer “might be put, somewhat paradoxically, by saying that the comprehensive human 
good isn’t everything and should not be the main human goal”.6 Nagel admits that, 
“Perhaps this is an unsatisfactory view of human nature and hence an unsatisfactory view 
of what it is for a human being to flourish”.7  Yet nonetheless Nagel offers that he finds it a 
“compelling position”.8 
 
4 Nagel (1981), 7. Nagel sees this tension as present in both the Eudemian Ethics and the 
Nicomachean Ethics.   
5 Ibid, 7. 
6 Ibid, 13. 
7 Ibid, 13. 
8 Ibid, 13. 





 It seems peculiar, at the very least, to suggest that something is both unsatisfactory 
and compelling.9 Furthermore, I am inclined to agree with Nagel: Such a view is 
unsatisfactory. Nagel’s reading seems to suggest that Aristotle has finally failed in what he 
articulates to be the goal of his project in the NE, viz. identifying and illustrating the chief 
good of human beings, in order that we might pursue it.10 It is certainly possible that Nagel 
is correct, i.e. perhaps Aristotle was finally unable to present a unified picture of the human 
good that incorporates every significant aspect of our nature in our flourishing. However, 
given how unsatisfying such a conclusion is about Aristotle’s thought, and the questions it 
leaves unanswered regarding the role of our political nature in our flourishing, scholars are 
justified in further pursuing another explanation of this tension in Aristotle’s thought.    
II. A second response to the problem of competing conceptions of eudaimonia is to 
suggest that in Book X Aristotle re-conceives the human good, acknowledging the 
possibility of our being eudaimon apart from the human community. While such a solution 
also remains a genuine possibility, it too suggests a serious dissonance in the whole of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. Not only does this thesis leave us puzzled about the final application 
of the first nine books of the NE, it leaves a discontinuity with Aristotle’s project in the 
Politics. We must remember that the NE and the Politics comprise a single philosophical 
work. After arguing in Book X that eudaimonia consists in a life of contemplation 
(theōria), Aristotle proposes that we next examine the various forms of government in 
order to determine which is most conducive to our flourishing as individuals in the human 
community. Scholars generally recognize the continuity between the NE and the Politics, a 
continuity that is supported by inter-textual evidence.  Aristotle concludes the Nicomachean 
Ethics with a recognizable segue into the philosophical content of the Politics: 
First, then, if there is anything that has been well said on any particular point by our predecessors, 
let us attempt to discuss that, and then, on the basis of our collected constitutions, try to observe 
what sorts of things preserve and destroy cities, and what sorts have these effects on each type of 
constitution, and what the causes are whereby some cities are finely governed and others the 
opposite. For when we have made these observations, perhaps we shall have a better view, too, on 
 
9 It is peculiar, but not unprecedented. There are some philosophical problems that seem fated to be 
like this. Philosophical accounts of free will, for example, seem often compelling and yet 
unsatisfactory.  
10 Aristotle states at the outset of the NE that the goal of his work is to identify the human good and 
to fill in the details as the work unfolds.  





what sort of constitution is best, and how each type is arranged, and what laws and customs it will 
have. Let us then make a start on the discussion. (1181b16-25)    
If Aristotle understood his Book X discussion of theōria to be such a radical re-
conception of human nature as to require the possibility of being eudaimon apart from the 
human community, one would hardly expect him to then move into a discussion of 
something as apparently parochial as the best form of government. Yet this is precisely 
what he does, and the conclusion of the NE suggests that this is a seamless transition.  
Aristotle concludes NE X by suggesting that the next natural step in his discussion is to 
examine political constitutions and “try to observe what sorts of things preserve and destroy 
cities” and “what the causes are whereby some cities are finely governed and others the 
opposite” (1181b18-21). Indeed, his entire subsequent discussion in the Politics is 
underscored by an understanding of human beings as by nature political animals (phusei 
politikon), and consequently, the notion that our flourishing is achieved in the context of the 
human community.   
III. A third way that scholars respond to the tension is by attempting a reconciliation 
between the comprehensive practical life and the life devoted to contemplation. This can be 
done either by attempting to show that Aristotle himself reconciled them, or by proposing a 
way in which Aristotle might have reconciled them. In her article “The Place of 
Contemplation in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,” Amélie Rorty makes a concerted effort 
to reconcile Aristotle’s account of the relative merits of the comprehensive practical life 
and the life devoted to contemplation. She argues for a way of reading Aristotle in which 
these lives need not be ‘competitors for the prize’.11 Rorty proposes a solution which, 
although not Aristotle’s own, she finds nonetheless ‘Aristotelian’.12 She argues that 
contemplation can be broadly construed to include the affairs of the comprehensive 
practical life. Thus, she claims that for Aristotle nothing about the practical life prevents its 
also being contemplative, since the practical life itself can be made an object of 
contemplation.13  
 
11 Rorty (1981), 377-378. 
12 Ibid, 378. 
13 Thus she suggests that “the range of contemplation is wider and its effects more far-reaching than 
has been generally allowed” (ibid, 377). 





One advantage of Rorty’s position is that it provides for the unity of the later books 
of the NE. In particular, as Rorty points out, she accounts for the order of the subject matter 
of Books VII-X. Specifically, Rorty suggests that her interpretation helps to explain the 
continuity of Aristotle’s discussion of pleasure in Book VII, which he resumes in Book X 
only after a lengthy discussion of friendship in Books VIII and IX:  
The discussion of friendship in Book 9 helps show what contemplation can contribute to the 
comprehensive practical life. By placing that discussion in the middle of his treatment of pleasure, 
Aristotle shows how virtuous friendship enables a person of practical wisdom to recognize that his 
life forms a unified, self-contained whole, itself an energeia. The discussion of friendship provides 
a transition from the Book 7 account of pleasure as the unimpeded exercise of basic natural 
activities to the Book 10 account of pleasure as the unimpeded exercise of basic natural activities—
an account that makes sense of a person finding pleasure in contemplating the whole of a virtuous 
life.14  
Rorty is right to seek an account that demonstrates coherence and unity in the 
overall text of the NE. Further, her account might go some length in attaining that goal. The 
problem is that her view fails to match up with Aristotle’s explicit description of theōria in 
NE VI, as well as the reasons that he offers in NE X for suggesting that the life devoted to 
theōria is the best life for the human being.    
In NE VI Aristotle distinguishes two forms of reason exercised by human beings, 
practical and theoretical. Practical reason is that “by virtue of which we reflect upon things 
that can be otherwise”; theoretical reason is that “by virtue of which we reflect upon the 
sorts of things whose principles cannot be otherwise” (NE 1139a6-8). The objects of 
practical reason include the deliberations and choices which govern the everyday affairs of 
human life. The objects of theōria are the necessary, unchanging, eternal truths or first 
principles of reality. Practical reason is productive, i.e. it is concerned with making one’s 
actions conform to one’s own best judgments. Theōria, in contrast, is an activity aiming at 
nothing beyond itself. This distinction between theoretical and practical reason is especially 
evident in Aristotle’s discussion of theōria in Book X: “Again, reflective activity [theōria] 
would seem to be the only kind loved because of itself: for nothing accrues from it besides 
the act of reflecting; whereas from practical projects we get something, whether more or 
less, besides the doing of them” (NE 1177b1-4). Theōria is an intellectual activity in which 
 
14 Ibid, 378. 





one beholds or gazes upon eternal truths for the sake of knowing them and delighting in 
that knowledge. Practical reason is deliberative thought about the best course of action for 
bringing about a desired state of affairs. Theōria is not the process by which we come to 
know first principles, but the activity of nous beholding known first principles, an activity 
attended by intense appreciation in the knower.15 The life devoted to theōria is that of the 
knower ever-increasingly appreciating the highest objects of human knowledge.  Such a life 
requires leisure, and seems to be most clearly exemplified by the ousiologist or 
philosopher. The life devoted to practical affairs and the continual exercise of practical 
reason does not afford such leisure.  It is most clearly exemplified in the legislator, whose 
concerns are dominated with guiding and administering the affairs of the state in 
accordance with his or her own best judgments, i.e. it is the life of the politician.16 The 
goods sought by the politician lie beyond the activity of politics, as they are concerned with 
attaining power, honors, and the general well-being of one’s fellow citizens (NE 1177b13-
15), whereas the telos of theōria consists in the activity itself (X.8).17   
In Book X Aristotle argues that the best human life is characterized by the activity 
of theōria. He bases his argument on the premises that our chief good must accord with 
whatever is most divine in us, and that that which is most divine in us is nous (NE 117712-
18).  The operation of nous is intellectual activity in accordance with the highest (kratistos) 
knowable objects, (NE 1177a19-21). Aristotle’s account of theōria, as well as the reasons 
he offers for suggesting that a life characterized by this activity is highest for a human 
being, pose a formidable challenge to Rorty’s attempt at synthesizing the life of practical 
 
15 Theōria is from theōrein, meaning “to consider” or “to gaze upon”. The theōros (formed from a 
combination of thea "a view" and horan "to see") is a spectator. Theōria is sometimes translated as 
“study”. However, I do not prefer this translation since “study” generally carries the connotation of 
the researcher gathering and memorizing facts. Theōria, however, is not the practice of coming to 
know, but the activity according to which the wise appreciate what they already know. Thus, I think 
a more fitting translation of theōria is “contemplation”, according to its Latin equivalent 
“contemplatio” meaning “to gaze intently upon”. Unlike the “seeing” we experience with our eyes, 
the seeing that belongs to theōria does not occur by way of perception, but via the active intellect or 
nous.  
16 The term “politician” has come to acquire rather pejorative connotations in our time. I am here 
using the term in the classical (and more noble) sense of a leader who acts diligently on behalf of 
the genuine interests of fellow members of the polis. 
17 This is consistent with the pleasure theōria affords because, for Aristotle, the activity and the 
pleasure never come apart.  Pleasure is the completion of the activity. I discuss this point later. 





activity with the life of theoretical activity. Contrary to Rorty’s assertion, there is good 
reason to think the practical and contemplative lives cannot be so easily combined. Given 
Aristotle’s distinction between the aims of practical reason and those of theoretical reason, 
as well as the distinction between the respective objects of each kind of knowledge, it 
seems that we cannot extend theōria to include the affairs of the practical life without doing 
violence to Aristotle’s text. The objects of theōria are not the parochial affairs of every day 
human existence, but the eternal and unchanging truths of mathematics, philosophy, 
cosmology, and astronomy. Rorty anticipates and attempts to meet this objection:  
While objects that do not change at all are paradigmatic cases of what is contemplated, it is also 
possible to contemplate the unchanging form of what does change. Species meet that requirement: 
they have no external telos: they are eternal and unchanging (1035b3-1036a1; 1030a6-1031a14). 
Even when the definition of a species is a pattern of a temporal life, that pattern can be 
comprehended in one timeless whole.18  
Here Rorty points out that the activity of practical reason is an activity of the human 
species, and that, for Aristotle, species are eternal. She then concludes that if we 
contemplate the nature of human beings and their activities under the aspect of a ‘timeless 
whole’, then we are still engaged in theōria. A problem with this response is not that Rorty 
is saying something false, but that she is changing the subject. When describing the 
practical life Aristotle is not concerned with the contemplation of the human species under 
the aspect of eternity, but with the time and energy required of us here and now in living a 
life devoted to practical affairs. This is evident not only in the examples he provides of the 
concerns belonging to the practical life, but on his continued insistence that the life of 
theōria is more leisurely than the life of political activity (EN 1177b4-26). For example, 
primary among the concerns that Aristotle cites belonging to the life of the politician is that 
of war: when and where to engage in battle, and how to go about doing so (NE 1177b4-17). 
Aristotle regards such concerns as presenting impediments (empodia) to theōria (NE 
1178b5). And surely he is right to do so: human beings are such that they cannot devote the 
required intensity of attention to contemplative appreciation of timeless truths while at the 
same time planning military strategies, balancing the economy, or administering law.    
 
18 Rorty (1981), 379. 





For the above reasons I think there remains a tension between the life of practical 
affairs and the life of contemplation, and I am inclined to think that Aristotle thought so as 
well: it is simply not possible for a human being to be fully engaged in both types of 
activities. Further, this tension presents an important question concerning the place of 
interpersonal relationships in human flourishing. If we accept Aristotle’s claim that the 
highest life is that of theōria, and that the activity of theōria is best exercised in the 
uninterrupted solitude of the philosopher, there might seem little reason left for devoting 
our time and energy to cultivating friendships, much less concerning ourselves with the 
parochial concerns of administering the affairs of the state. Such a matter is not ‘merely 
academic’, as it concerns how we ought to live our lives. Indeed the very goal of ethical 
inquiry for Aristotle is not our merely learning what the good life might look like for the 
human being, but our becoming good and flourishing.19 What, then, are we to conclude in 
light of Aristotle’s Book X discussion of theōria? Is he recommending, as Daniel Robinson 
jests, an asocial life in which we all “assume the lotus position, live solely on pumpkin 
seeds, and begin chanting our mantra?”20 I think not. In what follows I argue that, by 
 
19 Aristotle never fails to emphasize this point. He states it at the beginning and end of the NE 
(1095a5-6; 1179b3-10). Further, he approvingly cites Plato’s idea that the purpose of moral 
education is to teach us to delight in what is good and to be pained by what is worthless or wicked 
(NE 1104b11-13). For Aristotle, the person who merely learns what is good and fails to apply this 
knowledge is like one who listens carefully to his physician’s diagnosis, but then fails to do 
anything prescribed him (NE 1105b15-17). He repeatedly emphasizes that the end of ethical inquiry 
is not knowledge but action: “The present undertaking is not for the sake of theory [theōria], as our 
others are (for we are not inquiring into what excellence is for the sake of knowing it, but for the 
sake of becoming good, since otherwise there would be no benefit in it at all)” (NE 1103b27-29). In 
this case Aristotle presents theōria as a seeing or knowing that is contrasted with acting and doing. 
The end of ethical inquiry is not attaining theoretical knowledge about the good human life, but 
living a life of activity in accordance with virtue. So fundamental is this point that Sarah Broadie 
suggests that if we miss it we cannot even join Aristotle in his ethical inquiry: “We may examine 
his ethical doctrines and read and write books about them in order to understand and explain what 
he is saying. This is not the same as joining him in his ethical inquiry, because those who study him 
in this way want to know about Aristotle’s arguments, whereas Aristotle wants to know about the 
good life. <…> One possible reason for our wishing to understand Aristotle’s arguments is that they 
may help in a similar inquiry of our own. Aristotle, I imagine, would have regarded this as the best 
and perhaps as the only good reason for studying his or anyone else’s Ethics, and he would not have 
been at home with someone whose interest is purely academic, even though such scholars are at 
home with him or his texts” (Broadie (1991), 6). I think Broadie is correct: Aristotle would regard 
as myopic the attempt to reduce the study of ethics to an analytic enterprise by which we explore 
logical space (see also EE 1216b21-25 and Pol. 1279b12-15). 
20 Robinson (2004).  





examining Aristotle’s account of theōria in conjunction with his treatment of perfect 
friendship (teleia philia) we can better see how human relationships, and especially 
friendships, retain an integral role in eudaimonia.  
 
Teleology, Nature, and the Unmoved Mover  
 
Aristotle’s ethical thought is fundamentally teleological, and as such, takes as its 
starting point the notion of a thing achieving its good. There are two ways in which 
Aristotle conceives of a thing’s seeking its own good. The first can be referred to as 
‘performative’, while the second can be referred to as ‘emulative’.21 A thing seeks and 
attains its performative good in performing its peculiar function (ergon) with excellence.22 
The performative good of a natural object consists in actualizing its natural capacities. For 
example, a good peach tree is one that engages in its reproductive and metabolic activities, 
producing good peaches and other trees according to its kind. The emulative good of a 
natural object consists in its seeking to imitate the unmoved mover (ho prôton kinoun) 
insofar as possible. According to Aristotle, everything by nature both has (echō) and 
pursues (diōkō) something of the divine, and does so insofar as its nature permits (NE 
1153b28-34). Thus each living thing, insofar as its nature affords, emulates the eternal 
contemplative activity (noēsis) of the first mover (De An. 415b1). But, given that different 
natures possess different capacities, the manner and extent to which each thing imitates the 
first mover will be different.  
The native capacities of plants and non-human animals preclude them from 
engaging in contemplation: they lack nous. However, Aristotle recognizes in their 
reproductive activity an analogue of the divine. Through seeking the perpetuity of their 
species in reproduction, plants and animals emulate the eternal noēsis of the unmoved 
mover. According to Aristotle, the most natural act of a living organism is the production of 
another like itself: “an animal producing an animal, a plant a plant in order that, as far as its 
 
21 These are my own terms, not those of Aristotle. However, as I try to show, they are true to his 
account.   
22 It is this sense of something’s aiming at its good that Aristotle has in mind when, in the opening 
of the NE, he reminds us that the good is that toward which all things aim (διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο 
ταγαθόν, οὗ πάντ᾿ εφίεται) (1094a3). 





nature allows, it may partake in the eternal and divine. That is the goal toward which all 
things strive, that for the sake of which they do whatsoever their nature renders possible” 
(De An. 415a25-415b1). As Richard Kraut points out, “Plants and non-human animals seek 
to reproduce themselves because that is their way of participating in an unending series, 
and this is the closest they come to the ceaseless thinking of the unmoved mover”.23 All 
natural species imitate the unmoved mover. So, human beings, too, will do so insofar as 
their nature permits. Indeed, for Aristotle our lives are blessed (makarion) and flourishing 
(eudaimon) to the extent that they bear a likeness to divine activity: “The life of the gods is 
blessedly happy throughout, while that of human beings is so to the extent that there 
belongs to it some kind of semblance of this sort of activity” (NE 1178b25-27). Aristotle is 
not here suggesting he recognizes the “gods” as traditionally conceived in ancient Greek 
culture. He clearly rejects the vulgar anthropomorphic notion of the Homeric gods (NE 
1178b11-14). Nonetheless, he frequently continues to employ the language of hoi polloi 
when discussing ‘divine’ matters. When doing so, he refers to ‘the gods’ (theoi) as a place 
holder for that which is best or highest (kratistos).  In particular, he refers to ‘gods’ and ‘the 
divine’ when referring to noetic activity. Thus for example in X.8 he develops a link 
between ‘the gods’ and what is valuable about the ‘intellectually accomplished’:  
And the person whose intelligence is active [noun energōn], and who devotes himself to 
intelligence, and is in the best condition, seems also to be most loved by the gods [theophilestatos]. 
For if the gods have any sort of care for things human, as they are thought to do, it would also be 
reasonable to suppose both that they delight in what is best and has the greatest affinity to 
themselves (and this would be intelligence [nous]) and that those who cherish this most, and honour 
it, are the ones they benefit in return, for taking care of what they themselves love, and acting 
correctly and finely. And quite clearly, all these attributes belong most of all to the intellectually 
accomplished person. He, therefore, is most loved by the gods (NE 1179a23-32).  
In this passage Aristotle gestures at the traditional conception of the gods as having 
concern for human things, and links their love of the fine with the value of human noetic 
activity.24 In what follows I distinguish two distinct ways in which human beings exercise 
 
23 Kraut, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (2018): https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-
ethics/. 
24 Aristotle’s ‘theology’ is something of a difficult and controversial subject, but it seems that his 
considered position is that there is ultimately one ho prôton kinoun.Thus he concludes his 
discussion of the number of movers in Metaphysics Λ by approvingly citing Homer’s Illiad: ‘The 
rule of many is not good; let there be one ruler’ (1076a4). This does not, however, mean that he was 





their rational and noetic capacities to emulate divine activity. The first is found in the 
contemplation of first principles (theōria), the second, I will argue, is found in perfect 
friendship (teleia philia).  
 
Theōria and the Limits of Human Nature 
 
According to Aristotle, the unmoved mover is mind (nous) ceaselessly 
contemplating mind (Met. 1074b33-34). Human beings imitate the unmoved mover more 
perfectly than plants and non-rational animals because they possess and can exercise nous. 
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle identifies nous as the noblest and most divine aspect 
of our nature. Though we lack the full noetic capacity of the ho prôton kinoun, our 
possession of nous renders us more like divine than other animals: “for even if it (our nous) 
is small in bulk, the degree to which it surpasses everything in power and dignity is far 
greater” (NE 1177b34-1178a2).25 Aristotle suggests that our unique nature as rational 
animals lies in the possession and activity of this authoritative element of nous: “And each 
of us would seem [doxeie] actually to be this, given that each is his authoritative and better 
element” (NE 1178a2-3). Furthermore, because the best life for each thing lies in the full 
expression of its psychic capacities, he understands noetic activity as necessary for 
eudaimonia. Thus he states, “what belongs to each kind of creature by nature is best and 
most pleasant for each; for man, then, the life in accordance with intelligence [nous] is so 
too, given that man is [eiper] this most of all. This life, then, will also be happiest 
[eudaimonestatos]” (NE 1178a5-8).  
There are two ways in which human beings employ their rational capacities to 
emulate the divine. The first is in theōria. Unlike a divine being, human beings are 
incapable of directly and continuously contemplating first principles, let alone nous itself.26 
But in the intellectual activity of theōria we are capable of intermittently contemplating the 
 
a “theist”, as some Christian scholars misleadingly suggest. Traditional theism suggests that God 
takes an interest in human affairs, and Aristotle’s unmoved mover is clearly unmoved by such 
concerns.  
25 See also NE 1160a10-23 and 1168b28-33. 
26 It is not clear to me what Aristotle even means by referring to the activity of nous contemplating 
nous. I later attempt to offer an analogy that might be helpfully illustrative of his point when 
discussing the knowledge of a friend as another self (allos autos). 





first principles and eternal truths of cosmology, astronomy and mathematics. Further, a life 
characterized by such activity is, according to Aristotle, most like the divine (NE 1177b26-
31). Thus we find him in NE X apparently defending the thesis that the life devoted to 
theōria is the highest life. Yet within his defense of this thesis there emerges a pressing 
question: is such a life the life of a human being or that of a god?  
But such a life will be higher than the human plane; for it is not in so far as he is human that he will 
live like this, but in so far as there is something divine [theion] in him, and to the degree that this 
[being divine] is superior to the compound, to that degree will its activity too be superior to that in 
accordance with the rest of excellence. If, then, intelligence [nous] is something divine as compared 
to a human being, so too a life lived in accordance with this will be divine as compared to a human 
life. (NE 1177b26-31)  
When he refers to ‘the divine’ (theion) in this passage Aristotle is not employing the 
colloquial Homeric term. Instead he is using theion to focus specifically on nous and noetic 
activity. This suggests that theion in this passage is much closer to the unmoved mover of 
his Metaphysics—which Aristotle describes as noêsis noêseôs noêsis (mind contemplating 
mind, or thought thinking itself) (1074b34)—than to the vulgar anthropomorphic notions of 
the gods represented in the Homeric tradition. What then does this imply about Aristotle’s 
concluding observation in this passage? Is he suggesting that eudaimonia consists in a life 
of activity that actually transcends our nature? There seems strong evidence for an 
affirmative answer to this question in Aristotle’s immediate preceding remarks:  
One should not follow the advice of those who say ‘Human you are, think human thoughts’, and 
‘Mortals you are, think mortal ones’, but instead, so far as is possible, assimilate to the immortals 
and do everything with the aim of living in accordance with what is highest of the things in us. 
<…> This life, then, will also be happiest. (NE 1177b33-1178a1; 1178a 7-8).  
Given his prescription that we seek to live in accordance with what is most divine in 
our nature, coupled with his above observation that a life in accordance with nous is more 
divine than human, it might seem that Aristotle suggests that we seek our flourishing in a 
god-like existence of uninterrupted contemplation. But I think this is incorrect. Aristotle 
remains persistently sensitive to the fact that our nature renders such a life impossible. The 
self-sufficiency of the divine nature renders an existence of continuous contemplation 
possible. But human nature, Aristotle observes, is not self-sufficient (autarkēs) for 
sustaining continuous contemplation (NE 1178b33-34). As rational animals human beings 





have basic needs that the gods do not have, such as external prosperity and the nourishing 
and servicing of our bodies (NE 1178b33-35).27 Consequently, Aristotle never posits an 
identity between the eudaimonia of a human being and the blessedness (makarios) of a god. 
Rather, he is consistently careful to speak of our assimilating a likeness (homoiōma) of the 
divine life, and to recommend that we seek to do so only in so far as is possible (NE 
1177b33-34;1178b25-28).   
It is true then that, like a divine being, human beings possess nous. Yet, unlike 
human beings, a divine being is not a hylomorphic compound, and thus has no share in our 
bodily needs. Nor is a divine being, like a human being, phusei politikon. As Aristotle 
suggests, it seems laughable (geloios) to envision the gods engaged in the parochial affairs 
of naturally political beings: “Won’t they appear comic, carrying on transactions, returning 
deposits, and everything like that?” (NE 1178b11-12) Nor, he suggests, is it fitting to 
imagine them performing acts of generosity. Aristotle makes this final point by posing a 
rhetorical question: “To whom will they give?” (NE 1178b14) In this deft rejection of the 
traditional conception of the gods, Aristotle articulates a fundamental difference between 
the divine nature and human nature: what is fitting for a god might not be fitting for a 
human being. Hence, he concludes his train of thought with the observation that 
“Everything about practical doings, if one looks through all the kinds, will obviously turn 
out to be petty and unworthy of gods” (NE 1178b17-18).28  
Obviously the same objections cannot be made equally in reference to human 
beings. In the case of human beings, Aristotle’s questions lose their rhetorical force because 
they admit of an immediate answer: To whom shall we perform acts of justice and 
generosity? To one another, of course. Unlike a god, who neither lives in community nor 
realizes its blessedness in community, it is not absurd to imagine human beings engaged in 
activities that require the presence of others like themselves. The very nature of divine self-
sufficiency renders absurd the idea of needing friends. Yet, is it any less absurd to imagine 
 
27 Eudaimonia for human beings is not identical with a maximally blessed state of a divine 
existence (makaria) because the self-sufficiency (autarkeia) of a human being is not identical with 
that of a divine being. Divine self-sufficiency entails having no need of external parties to complete 
or sustain a blessed existence (NE 1178b11-18; see also EE 1245b14-15; MM 1212b34-13a7). 
28 There was already a strong precedent in Greek philosophical thought for rejecting and mocking 
anthropomorphic notions of the gods. This is especially notable in the fragments that survive from 
the philosopher, theologian, and poet Xenophanes of Colophon (c.570-c.475 BC).  





a human being living the life of a god than a god living the life of a human being? Surely 
not, and it seems precisely such an absurdity that Robinson is driving at when he asks if, in 
Book X, Aristotle is recommending that we live our lives in the lotus position.29 Indeed, as 
Aristotle himself observes, “it would be a strange thing, then, if one chose not one’s own 
life, but that of something else” since “what belongs to each kind of creature is best and 
most pleasant for each” (NE 1178a4-6). Here Aristotle is arguing that we should seek, 
insofar as possible, to live divine lives. I am suggesting this imperative cuts both ways: it 
points not only to the absurdity of a rational being living a bestial life, but also to the 
absurdity of a rational animal attempting to live the life of a god. What is needed, then, to 
bridge the gap between human and divine activity, is an account of human self-sufficiency 
and eudaimonia that properly accommodates the animal and political aspects of human 
nature without compromising his commitment to the importance of intellectual activity to 
our flourishing. In what follows I argue that he provides this in his discussion of perfect 
friendship (teleia philia).   
 
The Noetic Analogue of Virtuous Friendship 
 
We have seen that for Aristotle a proper account of our flourishing will involve the 
exercise of our rational nature. Further, we have seen that in the contemplation of first 
principles human beings can more closely emulate the unmoved mover than non-rational 
animals. Yet, we have also observed that, due to the limitations of our nature, human beings 
are incapable of sustaining this activity in the manner of a god. As creatures with bodies, 
we must tend to our physical well-being; as creatures that are fundamentally social and 
relational, we have a need to develop and sustain rich interpersonal relationships with other 
rational beings. Thus far I have said little about the second point. I will now address it in 
the context of Aristotle’s discussion of friendship. I argue that Aristotle’s notion of a friend 
as another self (allos autos) extends his account of human self-sufficiency to include 
virtuous friends as other selves, and that in friendship human beings can attain a unique 
noetic analogue of the self-reflexive noēsis of the unmoved mover.    
 
29 Robinson (2004).  





Though Aristotle recognizes that human friendships might be in part motivated by 
considerations of self-preservation, he does not regard such considerations as definitive of 
the best kind of friendship. He presents perfect friendship (teleia philia) as an activity 
expressing our rational nature.  Specifically, in friendship human beings come to possess—
and delight in possessing—a greater awareness and knowledge of one another, and thereby, 
a greater awareness and knowledge of themselves.30 The activity by which friends take 
pleasure in knowing one another is structured and informed by our rational nature. It is not 
the mere first-order perceptual awareness by which members of a sentient species perceive 
and gravitate toward others of their kind. Such first-order awareness is evident in the 
‘gregarious’ tendencies we observe in cattle and bees (NE 1170b14; Pol.1253a7-8). Nor is 
such awareness reducible to the unity of perception or ‘common sense’ (koinē aisthēsis) by 
which rational and non-rational animals discriminate between the information provided by 
their discrete senses. In De Anima Aristotle argues that in addition to the particular senses 
there must be a single common sense (koinē aisthēsis) by which any perceiving animal 
cognitively distinguishes, organizes, and synthesizes the information provided by its 
various senses, such as white and black, sweet and bitter, etc. Without this koinē aisthēsis 
such cognitive discrimination between the different senses is impossible, because it “cannot 
be effected by two agencies which remain separate; both the qualities discriminated must 
be present to something that is one and single” (De An. 426b 17-18). But the cognitive 
capacity for such discretion and synthesis among sensory stimulus is not by itself indicative 
of rational or noetic activity. As Suzanne Stern-Gillet points out, “unity of perception can 
obtain in the absence of self-awareness. Perception need not suppose apperception”.31 
However, in the perfect friendship of rational agents we find the additional presence of 
such self-awareness or apperception. In Aristotle’s account of perfect friendship there is a 
description of our rational nature expressing itself through a second-order awareness of 
ourselves in our friends.  
Aristotle highlights this second-order awareness in his culminating argument for the 
importance of friendship for eudaimonia. The argument appears in NE IX, where he 
 
30 See the following section “Aristotle on Knowledge of the Individual Self” for a discussion what 
‘knowledge’ of oneself or another amounts to for Aristotle. 
31 Stern-Gillet (1995), 19. 





reflects on a friend as another self (allos autos). The passage is extensive, and a bit 
cumbersome, but worth quoting in its entirety:   
But if being alive is itself good and pleasant (and it seems to be, also from the fact that everyone 
desires it, and the decent and blessed people most of all, since for them life is most desirable, and 
their vital activity is most blessed), and if the one who sees perceives that he sees, the one who 
hears that he hears, the one who walks perceives that he walks, and similarly in the other cases there 
is something that perceives that we are in activity, so that if we perceive, it perceives that we 
perceive, and if we think, it perceives that we think; and if perceiving that we perceive or think is 
perceiving that we exist (for as we said, existing is perceiving or thinking); and if perceiving that 
one is alive is pleasant in itself (for being alive is something naturally good, and perceiving what is 
good as being there in oneself is pleasant); and if being alive is desirable, and especially so for the 
good, because for them existing is good, and pleasant (for concurrent perception of what is in itself 
good, in themselves, gives them pleasure); and if as the good person is to himself, so he is to his 
friend (since the friend is another self): then just as for each his own existence is desirable, so his 
friend’s is too, or to a similar degree (NE 1170a25-1170b10). 
In this passage Aristotle points to the cognitive process over and above the koinē 
aisthēsis by which human beings not only recognize X, but are aware that they recognize 
X: “the one who sees perceives that he sees, the one who hears that he hears <…>” etc. [ὁ 
δ᾿ ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει] (NE 1170a29). In this passage 
Aristotle explicitly focuses on the role of this cognitive activity in intimate interpersonal 
relationships. He presents the second-order awareness that belongs to such activity as 
characteristic of the way friends relate to one another. Unlike non-rational gregarious 
animals that gravitate toward one another via a combination of first-order perceptual 
awareness and the herd mentality that follows upon biological necessity, Aristotle points 
out that human beings are capable of forming social relationships in which they and their 
counterpart perceive and appreciate perceiving one another, and at the same time know that 
they are doing so. As Aristotle (somewhat humorously) points out, friendships are 
characterized not by sharing the same pasture, but by coming to delight in sharing one 
another’s thoughts: “and this [concurrent perception] will come about in their living 
together, conversing, and sharing their talk and thoughts; for this is what would seem to be 
meant by ‘living together’ where human beings are concerned, not feeding in the same 
location as with the grazing animals (boskēma)” (NE 1170b12-14). Thus Aristotle would 
highlight not merely the instinctually gregarious tendencies of human beings, but the 
manner in which our gregarious tendencies are colored by our rationality, and how, in our 





most intimate interpersonal relationships we can obtain a pleasant apperception of 
ourselves in our friends.   
 
Aristotle on Knowledge of the Individual Self 
 
Before exploring the nature of this pleasant apperception of a friend as another self, 
and how it serves as an analogue of the noēsis of the unmoved mover, it is important to first 
say a few things about Aristotle’s concept of the self and the human person, as well as the 
possibility of our having knowledge of individual selves or persons. When discussing 
Aristotle’s treatment of the human person we must avoid anachronistically imposing onto 
his thought concerns that were not his own. Aristotle was not a ‘personalist’ in the 
contemporary sense of the term.32 His writing is not colored with the concerns of the 
individual interiority of consciousness that arose after the cogito in the modern era. Further, 
most of his work shows little, if any, concern with the privacy, uniqueness, or 
irrepeatability of the individual. Neither does he focus on considerations of subjectivity, 
self-determination, or personal value that preoccupy contemporary personalist 
philosophers.33 Most of his discussion of human beings proceeds from his working out a 
taxonomy of reality. From this perspective Aristotle’s concern is not particular individuals 
within nature, but the eternal attributes nature itself”. For example, when Aristotle offers 
‘rational animal’ as a definition of a human being, he does so from a scientific perspective. 
Such a definition arises from the formal and objective consideration of the human species, 
not from considerations of our individual subjective conscious lives.34 In this objective and 
formal sense there can be no knowledge of the uniqueness of the individual self as such.  
Theoretical knowledge of an individual as an existing subject is not possible for Aristotle. 
For, what is individual or peculiar (idion) to each of us is not eternal or immutable, unlike 
 
32 The person as an individual existing subject was not a common object of philosophical reflection 
for the Ancient Greeks. In fact, the Latin and Greek equivalents of ‘person’ (persona and prosōpon) 
refer to nothing more than a theatrical mask. The term would later take on more philosophical 
significance when appropriated by the Patristics in developing the Christian doctrine of the trinity.  
33 Similar observations have been made by Stern-Gillet (1995), 18 & 21-22.  
34 This is especially clear in De Anima, where Aristotle’s focus is not the qualitative aspects of 
individual personal consciousness, but on developing a theory of nous.  





the objects of knowledge in theōria. Theōria is an activity by which we contemplate 
substance (ousia), and knowledge of substance formally considered is knowledge of first 
principles (archē) and causes (aitia).35 Primary substances are individuals, but formal 
knowledge of substances is generic knowledge of the essence, given in the definition and 
taken universally.36 Nevertheless, despite the fact that when doing metaphysics Aristotle 
does not focus on considerations of the subjective individual, this does not imply that he 
cannot or never does accommodate the study of particular existing individuals. Indeed, 
when pursuing ethical and political inquiry Aristotle’s focus concerns not the place of the 
human being in a proper metaphysical taxonomy, but human beings as individuals acting 
for specific ends.37 
In his discussion of friends as other selves Aristotle brings perception and nous 
together in a manner unparalleled in any other place in his work. Stern-Gillet suggests that 
in NE IX Aristotle brings together second-order perceptual awareness and awareness of the 
self as such: “Only in the Nicomachean Ethics are second-order perceptual awareness and 
awareness of the self qua such brought together. Interestingly enough, the context is a 
discussion of the benefits uniquely brought about by virtue friendship”.38 Aristotle’s 
discussion of friends as other selves gives us an intelligible sense in which we might claim 
to know other individual human beings. But this is not only a knowledge of a human being 
as such, but a rationally and experientially informed second-order knowledge of another 
human being as the particular human being that they are. Such ‘knowledge’ comes about 
 
35 See Met. Α.1-3 for a discussion of the knowledge of substances, first principles, and causes.  
36 (Met. 1003a7-9; 1035b27-30; 1042a21-22;1053b16-18;1060b21-22). 
37 Regarding knowledge of individuals, Christopher Shields points out that for Aristotle “thought is 
of universals, whereas perception is of particulars (De Anima ii 5, 417b23, Posterior Analytics i 31, 
87b37-88a7), though he elsewhere will allow that we also have knowledge of individuals (De 
Anima ii 5, 417a29; Metaphysics xiii 10, 1087a20)” (Shields 2016). Shields argues that these 
passages are not contradictory, as Aristotle’s goal is to emphasize that thought proceeds at a higher 
level of generality than perception, due to its “trading in comparatively abstract structural features 
of its objects;” (Shields 2016). Shields brings his point home when he concludes: “a person can 
think of what it is to be a stone, but cannot, in any direct and literal sense of the term, perceive this;” 
(Shields 2016: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-psychology/). Perception discriminates 
among sensory data, but what it is to be a thing is grasped only by nous. Shields’ point could be 
equally applied to Aristotelian knowledge of individual human beings: we can think of what it is to 
be a human being, but we cannot in any direct literal sense perceive this.   
38 Stern-Gillet (1995), 21. 





through awareness of another person’s mental states and familiarity with his or her 
character.39 In NE IX Aristotle suggests that it is possible to gain experiential knowledge of 
another individual as a result of shared time and activities in which we have come to know, 
appreciate, and admire their character in an intimate way.40 Indeed, such knowledge and 
appreciation of another’s character is the ground of virtuous friendship. Of virtuous 
friendship Aristotle states,  
Such friendship also requires time for the parties to grow acquainted with each other’s character; for 
as the proverb has it, people cannot have got to know each other before they have savoured all that 
salt together, nor indeed can they have accepted each other or be friends before each party is seen to 
be lovable, and is trusted, by the other. (NE 1156b26-30)41  
Aristotle here suggests that over time and through shared activity human beings can 
come to know one another, and that such knowledge is the basis of friendship. But this is 
not the formal knowledge of the individual sub specie aeternitaties that Rorty proposed 
when attempting to synthesize the life of political activity with that of contemplation.  
Indeed, knowledge of the person from the cosmological perspective or under the aspect of 
eternity is not knowledge of the individual as such at all. Rather, in his discussion of 
friendship Aristotle is referring to a knowledge of another via familiarity with his or her 
character, and he identifies such knowledge as especially present in teleia philia.  
 
The Pleasant Apperception of a Friend as ‘Another Self’ 
 
Complete friends are individual human beings that have, through shared time and 
experience, become familiar with and come to depend upon each other’s character. As 
 
39 I place ‘knowledge’ in quotes here because, as I have argued above, the knowledge of individual 
persons belongs neither fully to nous nor is it reducible to first-order perception, but is rather 
something in between.  
40 See the following section “The Pleasant Apperception of a Friend as ‘Another Self’” for an 
illustration of how such awareness is attained and shared among friends. 
41 The precise origin and meaning of this proverb is uncertain. It is clear, however, that this 
reference to friends “savouring salt” together is meant to indicate their having a variety of 
experiences with one another. Salt tends to bring forth subtle differences of flavor, and it preserves 
what would otherwise rot or spoil.  It is also possible that salt here is a metaphor for toil, as the 
human being secretes salt through the sweat of hard work. Often persons who toil and labor 
together come to share a unique bond as a result. 





Aristotle points out, though the desire for friendship might arise quickly, developing 
friendship requires time. For, the parties must become acquainted with each other’s 
character, and only thereby can they come to trust each other (NE 1156b25-33). In this 
‘knowledge’ of each other’s character friends experience a pleasant apperception of one 
another as they delight in knowing that there is another who is perceiving, understanding, 
and taking pleasure in understanding the same things as themselves. Indeed, it would seem 
that in the most intimate of complete friendships individuals can become so familiar with 
each other’s character that they often need not articulate their thoughts in order for them to 
be known.  Between such friends there often occur what I will call ‘knowing moments’ that 
either go unarticulated, or are expressed in nothing more than a nudge or a knowing glance, 
and they are delightful to experience.  
Perhaps these knowing moments in friendship are best illustrated through an 
example. One of the most famous friendships in American history was that between John 
and Abigail Adams.42 It is well known that Abigail was the source of strength, 
encouragement, and at times gentle correction for John as he worked to formulate the 
governing principles of a young nation. This famous friendship has been represented in 
plays, novels, and biographies, as well as in an acclaimed HBO series “John Adams”.43 
John is a man of admirable character, and he wants people to know the fact.44 Sometimes 
 
42 One might wonder how ‘Aristotelian’ such an example is, given that Aristotle seemed convinced 
that women were incapable of complete friendship. Some scholars ignore this feature of Aristotle’s 
thought, while others attempt to explain it away. However, I am inclined to agree with Suzanne 
Stern-Gillet’s assessment that such attempts are ill-advised.  She addresses the issue as follows: “As 
is well known, Aristotle explicitly argued that women were incapable of the highest and best kind 
of friendship. I take the view that it does not behove commentators to gloss over or attempt to 
correct such bias of their authors. In this particular matter we must be content with the confidence 
that, had he lived today, Aristotle would most probably have revised his views on the nature of 
women. He was, after all, not only mindful of the opinions of the many but also sought to 
incorporate the views of the wise in his moral philosophy” (Stern-Gillet (1995), 9).  
43 Though this is a fictional representation I think it is helpfully illustrative of the way in which 
virtuous friends interact with, learn from, and enjoy one another. It is a fine example of art imitating 
life.  
44 To contemporary ears this desire for recognition might seem a mark against John’s character, 
insofar as it suggests an ambition contrary to humility. But Aristotle would not have shared this 
view. He did not regard humility as a virtue in the way many Christians would later suggest. For 
Aristotle, the great-souled man (megalopshuchos) is honorable and has an interest in the good of 
being recognized as such. However, for Aristotle doing what is honorable is more important than 
being honored. In this sense, Abigail’s gentle correction of John is quite Aristotelian. 





his eagerness for others to acknowledge his greatness carries him away. In a later 
memorable moment in the series we find an elderly John once again adamantly relating to 
Abigail his frustration with the lack of recognition he receives for all of his hard work: “If I 
had it to do all over again I would be a farming, shoe-making deacon like my father!”45 His 
complaint climbs to a crescendo as he blusters about, uninterrupted by Abigail, that is, until 
their eyes meet. At this moment, in the exchange of a glance, a whole host of things are 
communicated between the couple: John and Abigail are intimate friends possessing a long 
shared history in which they have come to know, and delight in knowing, each other’s 
character. Both John and Abigail are aware of John’s tendency to seek honors and 
recognition.  What is more, John knows that Abigail knows this about him, and she knows 
that he knows she knows it. As a consequence of their shared history and intimate 
knowledge of each other, Abigail is able to convey, in a single glance, a number of things 
to John: “John, you are doing it again. After all, what is more important here, that you do 
what is honorable by your fellow countrymen, or that you come to be honored by them? I 
think you know, John.  And I think you know that we both know”. All of this is conveyed 
in the knowing smile of Abigail, and John instantly perceives it. His awareness of the fact 
is conveyed by his response—silence, a sigh, and a returned smile that acknowledges 
Abigail’s gentle correction. In this exchange John experiences greater self-awareness 
through the pleasant apperception of himself in his wife.  Furthermore, his confidence that 
he is perceiving himself correctly is reinforced by the fact that what he is seeing is 
confirmed by the presence of another knower. This is the same ‘concurrent perception’ 
(sunaisthomenoi) of what is ‘in itself good’ (hauto agathon) and ‘yielding delight’ 
(hēdōmai) of which Aristotle spoke at NE 1170b4-5. Abigail is to John another self (allos 
autos). But she is not so only in the sense of being another instance of the same species as 
John, but in the sense that she is another knower known in her particularity by John, and 
through whom he has come to better know himself. Insofar as Abigail is another knower 
she is a fellow human being; however, insofar as she is another knower by whom John 
comes to better know himself, she is his friend.     
 
45 John Adams (2008).  Kirk Ellis wrote the screen play for this series, which was based on the book 
John Adams by David McCullough, Simon & Schuster: 2001). 





I suggest that in these knowing moments of pleasant apperception between virtuous 
friends we find an activity that stands as an analogue to the noēsis of the unmoved mover, 
and that this analogue helps us to understand the important role that interpersonal 
relationships retain in Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia. However, before arguing for this 
analogue I need to comment on the relevance of virtue to the experiential knowledge that 
leads to the pleasant apperception of oneself in a friend. After all, one might wonder 
whether the vicious could experience it.  Aristotle thinks not, and there are two reasons he 
maintains this. First, the vicious person lacks an integrated and unified self to behold. 
Second, what the vicious person does behold of his attenuated self is not pleasant to him.  
For Aristotle ‘self’ is an achievement term, an honorific title, indicating a psychological 
cohesion or unity resulting from integration of intents and desires. As Stern-Gillet points 
out, for Aristotle ‘self’ “denotes a state of equilibrium between the various parts of the soul, 
and constitutes an ideal towards which we should strive but which we may not reach”.46 
The vicious person’s soul, however, is in disarray due to his possessing conflicting desires 
which pull in opposite directions.  
And since they have no lovable qualities there is nothing friendly about their attitude to themselves.  
Nor, then, do such people rejoice with themselves, or grieve with themselves; for their soul is in a 
state of faction, and one side, because of depravity, grieves at holding back from certain things, 
while the other is pleased, the one pulling in this direction and the other in that, as if tearing the soul 
apart. (NE 1166b16-21)      
The faction and internal rebellion of the vicious person’s soul renders him in want 
of a unified and integrated self upon which he can reflect. Moreover, what he does see 
when he looks upon himself is hateful, and a source of pain. As Aristotle puts it, “the bad 
person, then, does not appear to be disposed in a friendly fashion even towards himself, 
because he has nothing lovable about him” (NE 1166b25-26). For the vicious, being alone 
means the memory of odious things past and the promise of more of the same to come (NE 
1166b12-18). Thus the vicious seeks in the company of others a distraction from the person 
he is (NE 1166b15-17). Aristotle regards friendship to be beyond the capacity of such a 
person. The bad person is miserable and wretched (athlios), lacking the friendly disposition 
 
46 For Aristotle, the truly vicious person, because his soul is so disordered, does not find himself 
pleasant. Further, for Aristotle the vicious person is, as Stern-Gillet points out, less of a self, due to 
the lack of integration and order of his soul (Stern-Gillet (1995), 29). 





(philikōs diakeisthai) toward himself that is prerequisite for developing friendship (NE 
1166b26-28). Thus Aristotle links virtue to friendship, and so to well-being; and he links 
vice and self-isolation to incapacity for friendship, and lack of well-being.  
 
Divine Noēsis and the Love that Belongs to Friendship 
 
In what remains I examine how concurrent perception (sunaisthomenoi) within 
perfect friendship reflects a uniquely human use of our rational capacities to mimic the 
noēsis of the unmoved mover. To argue for this claim I posit an analogue between divine 
noēsis and the pleasant apperception of another self within virtuous friendship. To posit an 
analogue between two things is to suggest that, while not identical, they are relevantly 
similar.47 Thus, I need to say something about the relevant similarities and dissimilarities 
between the noēsis of the divine and the activity by which friends are recognized and 
experienced as other selves.      
As I pointed out at the beginning of this essay, according to Aristotle all things 
imitate the divine insofar as their nature affords; and human beings are happy to the extent 
that their lives resemble divine activity (NE 1178b25-27). The highest divine activity is the 
noēsis of the unmoved mover. This noēsis is the activity of nous self-reflexively 
contemplating nous (noêsis noêseôs noêsis) (Met. 1074b34). The pleasant apperception in 
teleia philia by which perfect friends behold themselves in each other is a cognitive activity 
analogous to the noesis of the unmoved mover. In the activity of friendship we employ our 
rational capacities to see, enjoy, and reflect upon enjoying, other minds like our own. This 
seeing is a rational activity by which we come to an ever-increasing knowledge and 
appreciation of our friends through ourselves and ourselves through our friends. This 
‘seeing’ extends beyond mere perception, as it draws not only on the immediate stimuli of 
the senses, but combines that stimuli with the knowledge of an individual that is derived 
 
47 In Topics Aristotle recognizes the usefulness of reasoning by analogy for a number of purposes. 
“The examination of likeness is useful with a view both to inductive arguments and hypothetical 
deductions, and also with a view to rendering definitions. It is useful for inductive arguments, 
because it is by means of an induction in particular cases that are alike that we claim to induce the 
universal; for it is not easy to do this if we do not know the points of likeness. It is useful for 
hypothetical deductions because it is a reputable opinion that among similars what is true of one is 
true also of the rest” (Top. 108b7-14). 





from a history of shared activity and thought. What is more, there is not only this awareness 
of the individual, but awareness that this awareness is being mutually shared.     
Unlike divine noēsis, the self-reflexive knowledge and appreciation of other minds 
we experience in friendship does not consist in a direct vision of nous by nous.48 Rather, it 
occurs in accordance with our mode of understanding, which is not divorced from the 
particulars of experience. It is the seeing and knowing of another mind that comes about as 
the result of a shared history in which we have come to know and appreciate the thoughts 
and character of another. By attaining such knowledge, we come to see and hear our own 
selves reflected in our friends’ words, mannerisms, and actions. In the knowing moments of 
pleasant apperception shared between friends there occurs a rational recognition of another 
like oneself. This is not merely the awareness of another member of the species to which 
we belong, but another member that knows us as the particular individual that we are within 
that species.  
This activity represents a stronger analogue to self-reflexive divine noēsis than the 
imitations of the eternal that Aristotle identifies in the reproductive activity of plants and 
animals, through which they participate in an unending series that approximates unceasing 
noēsis (De An. 415a25-415b1).49 Unlike plants and animals, the divine nature does not 
reproduce, but it does exercise nous and maintain the cosmos. The pleasant apperception by 
which friends recognize themselves in each other imitates the self-reflexive contemplation 
characteristic of divine noēsis. Further, while this pleasant apperception of oneself in a 
friend is not sustained with the perpetuity of divine noēsis, it need not be momentary or 
briefly episodic.  It can vary in duration and intensity. Sometimes it occurs just through 
knowing that we are in the presence of our friends. As rational and gregarious animals, 
human beings find experience enhanced by the presence of a familiar like-minded 
individual. We might take as evidence for this the pleasure we take in knowing that we are 
seeing the same things as our friends, and much in the same way that they do. Consider, for 
 
48 Indeed, the very notion of a direct vision of nous by nous that seems to belong to the activity of 
noêsis noêseôs noêsis, (which might literally be translated as thinking thinking thinking) seems so 
abstract as to be beyond our ken. Yet the notion appears to retain some conceptual content for 
Aristotle when speaking of divine noetic activity (Met. 1074b34). 
49 The series is ‘unending’ because, for Aristotle, species are eternal.  For a detailed discussion and 
defense of this claim see Lennox (2001). 





example, the unique delight that friends take in shared activities such as the mutual 
enjoyment of a work of art, or a piece of philosophical literature. Unlike a divine being, our 
experience and understanding of the world, and consequently our understanding of 
ourselves as perceivers and knowers, is enriched, confirmed, and enjoyed in the company 
of our friends because through them we know that we are not alone in having it.  
So far I have attempted to show that the noetic aspects of complete friendship are 
analogous to divine noēsis because in perfect friendships human beings, in accordance with 
their nature, mimic the self-contemplative activity of mind contemplating mind. This is one 
way we can see how the activity of friendship can accord with what is ‘most divine’ in our 
nature, and thus relates to our being eudaimon. There is, however, a less ethereal way to 
understand how this final knowledge within friendship accords with what is most divine in 
our nature, and it can be seen without appealing to the admittedly abstract notion of the 
unmoved mover as noêsis noêseôs noêsis. This is the likenesses we discover between the 
activity of seeing ourselves in our friends and the divine activity of theōria.  Like theōria, 
which produces “pleasures amazing in purity and stability” the second person experience of 
oneself in a friend is delightful to the rational being.  Further, like theōria, it is a rational 
activity aiming at nothing beyond itself (NE 1177a26). The delight is taken in what is being 
seen, not in anything further to be accomplished, and this delight signifies the completion 
of the activity.50 This delight obtains not in reference to the process by which we come to 
acquire such knowledge of ourselves, but in the final activity of actually seeing and 
knowing ourselves. Although this seeing can certainly assist in reinforcing the stability of 
virtuous character, Aristotle finally emphasizes not its instrumentality, but its being 
intrinsically delightful.  
Perhaps we can better understand this pleasant apperception of a friend and how its 
accompanying pleasures bear a similitude to those of theōria by returning once again to the 
Adams example. When John’s diatribe is arrested mid-sentence by the gaze of Abigail, the 
smile that John returns to her is not a result of his having come to learn something new 
about himself, but seeing and appreciating something they both already know. In this 
moment we observe in the couple’s reciprocal expressions not the desiderative gaze of the 
lover for the beloved, but the appreciative gaze of seeing oneself in another through the 
 
50 As Aristotle argues, pleasure is the completion (teleios) of an activity (energeia) (NE 1175a21). 





mutual recognition of the particular person that one is. Just as theōria is not the acquiring of 
knowledge, but the final appreciation of knowledge acquired, so also the apperceptive 
knowledge of a friend is the final act of rationality in teleia philia. The object of this 
pleasant apperception is not, as in the activity of theōria, something eternal and 
unchanging. Nevertheless, it is, insofar as the parties are virtuous, an object of considerable 
stability and ‘stayability’. For Aristotle virtue is not only the most critical element of 
eudaimonia, it is also the most stable and abiding. Thus one could expect that, the more 
virtuous one is, the more dependably he or might become a pleasant object of apperception.   
My emphasis on the pleasure or delight of this activity should not be understood as 
an attribution of hedonism to Aristotle. For Aristotle, the experience of pleasure is not the 
measure of a thing’s being good, but the measure of the agent who experiences it: “The 
pleasure or pain that supervenes on what people do should be treated as a sign of their 
dispositions [hexeis]” (NE 1104b3). Worthless people take pleasure in worthless things and 
vicious activities, good people take pleasure noble things and virtuous activities. What an 
individual finds pleasurable depends a great deal on the habits he or she cultivates. For 
Aristotle it is possible to learn to take pleasure in various sorts of activities through 
habituation and repeated exposure. Even horrific bestial activities can come to be 
experienced as pleasant through “habit” (ethos) or some “disablement” (pērōsis) of an 
individual (NE 1148b16-17).51 Thus it is sufficiently clear that Aristotle has no intention of 
suggesting pleasure alone is indicative of an activity’s being good, much less does he 
regard pleasure, in any sense, as ‘the good’.        
However, one might still wonder why the experience of this delightful apperception 
of oneself in a friend applies only to the virtuous, and is not to be extended to the vicious. 
After all, might the villain not only delight in his villainous ways, but also in seeing those 
villainous ways reflected back to him in friend? I earlier responded in part to this question 
when I suggested that the vicious man’s character leaves him dwarfed and atrophied, 
having less of a self to behold. But more can be said in response to this question on 
Aristotle’s behalf. As is clear from his example of the Black Sea cannibals, Aristotle does 
not deny the psychological capacity for people to delight in the terrible. So we should not 
 
51Aristotle cites the cannibalism of tribal people near the Black Sea who are reputed to enjoy 
surgically removing their young from the womb in order to devour them (NE 1148b20-25).  





expect him to deny the possibility of perversely enjoying a similitude of one’s own vice in 
one’s friend. However, the fact that it is psychologically possible to experience something 
as pleasurable tells us nothing of its value. Aristotle clearly regards some pleasures as 
contrary to our nature, and therefore, ultimately contrary to our flourishing. Determining 
the normative value of an activity requires understanding its relation to the ends of our 
nature and our eudaimonia. No culture which devours its young will flourish, no matter 
how pleasurable the people in that culture might find the practice. Neither will the villain 
flourish in his villainy, though he disable himself into enjoying it.         
Let us then turn to the pleasure that the virtuous take in seeing themselves in their 
friends. For Aristotle, the good man takes pleasure in seeing himself because he is good, 
and he accomplishes this in a unique way through his friend: 
But as we saw, the good man’s existence is desirable because of his perceiving himself, that self 
being good; and such perceiving is pleasant in itself. In that case, he needs to be concurrently 
perceiving the friend—that he exists too—and this will come about in their living together, 
conversing, and sharing their talk and thoughts. (NE 1170b9-13)  
Aristotle goes on to link this pleasant apperception of a virtuous friend to being 
eudaimon: 
For the blessed person, if his existence is desirable in itself (being naturally good and pleasant) and 
so, to a similar extent, is the friend’s, the friend too will be something desirable. But what for him is 
desirable he must have, or else he will be lacking in this respect. So: the person who is to be happy 
will need friends possessed of excellence. (NE 1170b14-19)  
Unlike the noēsis of the unmoved mover, or the activity of theōria, the delightful 
apperception of oneself in a friend requires the presence of another. As we have seen, 
Aristotle takes the unique delight that accompanies the pleasant apperception of oneself in a 
friend as evidence that even the virtuous will need friends if they are to be eudaimon (NE 
1170b14-19). This extension of the self in NE IX to the inclusion of one’s friends expounds 
on a distinguishing mark of human self-sufficiency for Aristotle. In this discussion of 
friends as other selves, Aristotle extends the notion of the individual ‘self’ (autos) to 
include one’s friend as ‘another self’ (allos autos), and thus articulates an important 
distinction between human and divine self-sufficiency (autarkeia). Unlike the unmoved 
mover, whose self-sufficiency entails noetic perfection in the absence of any external 





party52, human self-knowledge is perfected and more thoroughly enjoyed in the company of 
another. As other selves friends are minded mirrors of one another. In mirroring one 
another they engage in a uniquely human analogue of divine activity, as they grow in 
mutual love and knowledge of themselves through one another.   
 
 
John A. Houston 
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